Ethical Perceptions on Earnings Manipulation in Turkey: An Exploration of Differences in Preparers and Users' Perspectives by Atik, Asuman & Ismail, Tariq H.
 Research Journal of Finance and Accounting      www.iiste.org 
 ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
 Vol 2, No 3, 2011 
 
169 
 
 
Ethical Perceptions on Earnings Manipulation in Turkey: 
An Exploration of Differences in Preparers and Users’ 
Perspectives 
 
Asuman Atik (Corresponding author) 
Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Marmara University, 
Goztepe Campus, Goztepe, Istanbul, Turkey 
Email addresses: aatik@marmara.edu.tr 
 
 
Tariq H. Ismail 
Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Commerce, Cairo University, 
P.O. Box 12613 Orman, Giza, Egypt 
Email: thassaneen@cu.edu.eg 
Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Management and Humanities, Majmaah University, 
P.O.Box 66, Majmaah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
Abstract 
This study focuses on the impact of a more comprehensive set of scenarios that might be followed by 
accounting practitioners and leading to earnings manipulations, where such scenarios are yet to be 
investigated in Turkey and this study is the first to explore this issue. This study examines the ethical 
perception differences concerning the three types of earnings manipulations; which are income 
smoothing, earnings management and big bath accounting, between users and preparers’ perspectives of 
financial information in Turkey. A structured questionnaire composed of seven scenarios was used to 
elicit responses from users; based on 82  financial  analysts  and  portfolio  managers’  
responses,  and  preparers  of  financial statements; using responses from 56 independent and 56 
company affiliated accountants. 
The results reveal that there are significant differences between the ethical perceptions of users and 
preparers related to some types of earnings manipulations. Additionally, the most unethical tool of 
earnings manipulations is fraudulent accounting, followed by manipulation through accounting 
changes and manipulation through operational changes. The study provides insight on the current and 
potential direction of earnings manipulation in Turkey and help regularity bodies in their efforts to 
tighten and improve reporting standards and regulations. 
Keywords: Earnings manipulat ion, income smoothing, earnings management , big bath 
accounting, financial information, user of financial information, preparers of financial information, Turkey. 
1.  Introduction 
The preparation and presentation of high quality financial reports is the responsibility of management 
and accountants. Additionally, independent auditors play an important role in ensuring the reliability of 
information provided and increasing the public confidence in the financial reports. Users of financial 
reports are investors (current or potential), creditors , suppliers , employees , g o vernmenta l  
agencies    and other  interested  parties. All those users are external parties who can not get 
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information directly from internal sources  and  their  information  needs  are  supposed  to  
be  satisfied  with  the  information provided to them. 
Users  always  require  true,  reliable,  verifiable  and  timely  financial  information  
about companies.   Stockholders  and  potential  investors  use  financial  information  in  
making investment decisions, banks  use  it in making credit decisions, suppliers and prospective 
employees  may decide  which  companies  to  work  with  by using the  provided  financial 
information (Fischer and Rosenzweig 1995). 
This study is based on the assumption that users and preparers of financial information are two 
different groups who have conflicting interests. For example, in the case of borrowing, an accountant 
manager wishes to decrease cost of borrowing, on the other hand, a financial analysts, who provides 
credit decisions tries to increase interest rate or selling price of money, hence, the accountant and the 
financial analyst have conflicting  interests. However, studies t h a t  examined the fairness judgments 
of conflicting parties, especially in negotiations, showed that “the parties make egocentric 
interpretations about the fairness and deem a settlement as a fair settlement when it is biased in favor 
of their own side” (Paese and Yonker 2001, p.  114). Therefore, earnings manipulation,   which  
will  make  financial statements look better and decrease cost of borrowing, might be perceived as 
less unethical by an accountant than a financial analyst. 
Most of the previous research investigated how accountants and accounting students (or preparers) 
perceive earnings management practices and they focused on the methods used for manipulation. They 
ignored the earnings manipulations other than earnings management and parties o ther  than preparers .  
The only study that  t r ied  to  unders tand  ethically related judgments of “users” belongs to 
Kaplan (2001b). However participants of that study were not real users, rather, they were MBA students 
who were assigned roles of shareholders and non- shareholders. A real user’s ethically related judgments 
about earnings manipulation may be much different than an MBA student’s judgment.  
We believe that there are differences between preparers and users as well as diverse types and 
approaches to accounting manipulations. However, previous studies could examine only preparers with 
reference to earning management, hence, we complement and extend these studies by looking at the 
impact of users and preparers on accounting manipulations under diverse approaches to accounting 
manipulations. The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  extend  the  study of  Kaplan  
(2001b)  in  order  to investigate   whether  there  are  significant  differences  in  ethical  
perception  of  earnings manipulations between  preparers  and  users  of  financial  
information in  Turkish settings.  
Unlike Belski et al. (2008) and Ng et al. (2009), the current study focuses on the impact of a more   
comprehensive  set   of   scenarios  that   might   be   followed  leading  to   earnings 
manipulation, where such scenarios are yet to be investigated in Turkey and this study is the first to 
explore this issue. This investigation may assist regulators to understand the impact of ethical 
perceptions of preparers and users of financial information and thereby help them specify ways to 
improve the provision of more information by listed Turkish companies. Therefore, this paper 
contributes to the literature by (i) examining the ethical perceptions of “users” related to earnings 
manipulations rather than just examining the ethical perceptions of “preparers, and (ii) testing the 
ethical perceptions related to three different types of earnings manipulation (income smoothing, 
earnings management and big bath accounting) rather than just earnings management. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  proceeds  as  follows;  section  two  provides  general  overview  of 
accounting  in   Turkey,  section  three  presents  a  review  of  the  literature  on  earnings 
manipulation; section four illustrates the development of the research hypotheses followed by a description 
of the research methodology. Section five is the analysis of results and discussion. Finally, section six 
provides conclusions and gives a summary of the main findings of this study, followed by the study 
limitations in section seven.  
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2. General overview of accounting in Turkey 
In Turkey, as an emerging economy, expansion of the trading and industrial production made 
accounting applications more effective and inevitable. In addition, until   the   establishment   of   
Accounting   and   Auditing   Standards   Board   of   Turkiye (TMUDESK) in 1994, 
accounting profession was not organized in a legal structure. This situation r evea l s  mu ch  d ive r s i t y  
among companies’ r epor t ing  sys tems  a n d  accounting applications in the same sector. 
On the other hand, another reason of the reporting diversities in Turkey came into practice as a result of 
uncompromised attitudes of the standard setting institutions (TMUDESK, 2000:1). Today there are two 
main accounting standards issued by the Ministry of Finance and Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
(SPK). In practice, it is seen that SPK adjusted its own chart of accounts according to the notifications 
of the Ministry of Finance.  Although the financial statement’s form of these two institutions is 
similar, there are some differences about the accounting concepts and asset evaluation a p p r o a c h e s . 
Besides, the adoption of IAS to the Turkish accounting system by TMSK is an important step for the 
reporting standardization for the future. However, all companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
are required to follow IFRSs. Communique Serial: XI No: 25 allows an option to follow IFRSs in one of 
two ways due to delays in translating IFRSs into Turkish: 
• A listed company can follow the official English version of IFRSs as published by the IASB, in 
which case the audit report and basis of presentation footnote make an explicit statement of 
compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards. 
• A listed company can follow the Turkish translation of IFRSs. Because of the translation 
delay, the audit report and basis of presentation footnote state that the financial statements 
comply with "IFRSs as adopted for use in Turkey". 
Financial reporting in Turkey is tax-driven and companies try to determine t a x -purpose   income 
rather  t h a n  performance evaluation -purpose income.  Generally tax  laws  determine 
accounting treatments. With the  establishment of the Capital Market Board in 1986,  financial  
accounting  standards  started  to  be  developed,  and  all  publicly  traded companies  
are required  to  apply  IFRS  a s  o f  beginning  of January  2005.  However,  the 
important point is that because  Turkey has not a developed capital market, only a small portion of 
the companies applies IFRS, higher portion (especially family-owned and small to medium sized 
companies) continues to prepare financial  statements according to tax laws. This fact plays an 
important role in the determination of financial reporting quality in Turkey. 
Furthermore, another economic factor that encourages manipulation of accounts in Turkey is the inflation. 
Inflation rate in Turkey has been very high for many years; in 2004 it dropped to one-digit number as a 
first time after nearly 30 years. Although inflation rate was high, inflation accounting was not allowed 
in Turkey until 2004 and this caused fictitious earnings and increased tax burden. Governors, who have 
been trying to win the battle with inflation and improve the economical conditions for many years, say 
that increasing tax rates and economic austerity policies are unavoidable. Because of high inflation 
rates, high tax rates, and difficult economic conditions, it is not easy for many companies to stay alive 
and continue operations. In such environment, earnings manipulation may be deemed as ethical by the 
company owners and workers (including accountants) who make a choice between bankruptcy and 
staying alive. Therefore, the current paper sheds light on the ethical perceptions of earnings 
manipulation between preparers and users and paves the way for standards setters towards developing 
accounting standards that reduce earnings manipulation. 
3. Literature review 
According  to  the  literature,  there  are  mainly  three  types  of  earnings 
manipulation; income smoothing (IS), earnings management (EM), and big bath accounting (BBA).  
Income s m o o t h i n g  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  t o    explain t h e  m a n i p u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o r  o f  
management to diminish the variability of income streams and to prevent sharp decreases and increases 
in income figures (Atik 2009). According to Ashari, et al. (1994, p. 291), “income smoothing is 
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deliberate voluntary acts by management to reduce income variation by using certain a c c o u n t i n g  
devices .”  Earnings  management  is  used  in  the  studies  when  it  is hypothesized 
that  management tries to increase or decrease income figure with a specific purpose,  such  as  
decreasing   earnings  before  a  managerial  buyout  (DeAngelo 1986), increasing share prices 
before an initial public offering (Teoh, et al., 1998; Roosenboo  et al.  2003), increasing bonus 
payments  (Guidry, e t  a l .  1999), decreas ing  tax p ayab le s  (Keating, et al. 2000) and decreasing 
debt contracting costs (Beatty and Weber 2003). Stolowy and Breton (2000, p.43) define big bath 
accounting as large profit reducing write- offs or income-decreasing discretionary accruals in income 
statements especially when a new chief executive officer (CEO) is appointed, so new CEO cleans the 
accounts to be able to use it in the future to smooth earnings. Walsh et al. (1991) points out that in most 
studies related to big bath accounting, the attention has focused on proving the incidence of large 
write-offs. 
On the other hand, there are three types of methods that are used to manipulate earnings, where  
earnings  manipulations  can  be  made  through  (i)  changes  in  operations,  such  as 
changing time of  an investment  or  an  advertising campaign, (ii) changes  in accounting 
methods or estimates, such as changing the estimates of bad debts or changing depreciation method, or 
(iii) fraudulent accounting practices, such as recording fictitious sales. 
Bruns and Merchant (1990) provide a leading study on ethical perceptions of accounting 
manipulations. They tried to explore the morals of short-term earnings management using a 
questionnaire, composed of thirteen hypothetical operating and accounting manipulation methods of 
earnings management situations.  The survey was directed to 649 participants representing general 
managers, finance managers, control and  audit managers. The results reveal that operating 
manipulations were judged more favorably than manipulations based on accounting methods, because 
when operating manipulations are used, earnings numbers show what actually happened.  Additionally, 
earnings management was deemed more acceptable when (i) the result reduced earnings rather than 
increasing it, (ii) the change was small, and (iii) it was made to meet an interim quarterly budget target 
rather than to meet an annual budget target. 
A number of research have employed the Bruns and Merchant (1990)’ questionnaire to test ethical 
perceptions of earnings management.  Among them are Fischer and Rosenzweig 1995, Clikman et 
al.  2001, Geiger et al.  2003, Özer  et al.  2003.  Fischer  and Rosenzweig  1995  surveyed  
a  sample  of  undergraduate  students,  MBA  students  and accounting practitioners. The 
results are consistent with Bruns and Merchant 1990, where all the groups surveyed have a greater 
tolerance for operating expense manipulations than the manipulations based on accounting methods. 
Fischer and Rosenzweig 1995 commented that one of the possible reasons of these findings is that many 
people think of ethics as a list of rules and assume that if something is not expressly prohibited, one 
need not worry about ethics. Clikeman et al. 2001 tried to find out whether gender and national origin 
influence accounting  students’  perceptions  of  earnings  management  based  on  a  
sample  of  115 accounting students (54 male and 61 female) from six different countries (USA, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan). The findings did not support that gender and 
culture significantly affect judgments on the ethical acceptability of earnings management. Geiger et al. 
2003 extended Clikeman et al. 2000 study to test the impact of national culture o n  ethical  perceptions 
of earnings management.  They  used  a  sample  of  898 accounting  students  from  
eight  countries  (Australia,  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, Singapore, Spain, UK and  
USA). The findings suggested that individuals from different countries vary significantly in their 
general perceptions regarding earnings management. However, there was only minimal association 
between perceptions and the five cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Özer et al. 2003 examined ethical 
judgments of  undergraduate, MBA  and  PhD  students,  top  executives  and  accounting staff  
on  earnings  management. Results showed that significant variances exist among ethical judgments 
concerning not only the type of manipulations but also within and between the groups of respondents. 
Kaplan (2001a) conducted an experimental study on MBA students to understand whether an 
individual’s ethically related judgments in response to earnings management activities are associated 
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with the individual’s role. The students were assigned one of three different roles: a shareholder, another 
manager from the company who is unfamiliar with the manager engaging in earnings management 
behavior or another manager from the company who is familiar with the manager engaging in earnings 
management behavior. Results showed that individuals’ assigned role do not appear to make 
differentiated ethically related  judgments across different scenarios of earnings management as well as  
individuals view any attempts to manipulate earnings are equally unethical. 
Belski et al.  (2008)  extended prior studies that examined the ethics of earnings management by 
further examining individuals' judgments of ethical acceptability related to specific earnings 
management activities as they relate to the intent and type of the earnings management manipulation.  
The experiment was conducted using business school students from a public university who responded 
to six hypothetical vignettes involving the management of earnings. The study found that the intent of 
the earnings management matters, where managers engaging in earnings  management  that  was  
deemed  opportunistic  or  selfish  were  considered  more unethical (or  less  ethical)  than 
earnings  management behavior aimed  at  increasing firm contracting efficiency. Additionally, the 
study found that the method of the manipulation was also important. Accounting estimate manipulations 
was considered the least ethical followed by economic operating decisions. Changes in accounting 
method were considered the least unethical. 
Grasso et al. (2009) focused on the ethical perception of earnings management using a survey that 
compares accounting students’ and professionals’ perception of the ethics of earnings management 
before and after the accounting scandals that led to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002 (SOX) 
in USA. The 14-item version of Merchant’s earnings management survey instrument was used. The 
results suggest that professionals and students in the era following the passage of SOX find earnings 
management more questionable and less ethical than their pre-SOX counterparts. Overall, the 
high-profile accounting scandals appear to have a higher effect than SOX on the perceived ethics of 
earnings management. In   addition,  the   results  indicated  that   accounting  
manipulations  were  perceived  as significantly less  ethical  than  operational  
manipulations  both  pre-  and  post-SOX.  On  a relative basis,  professionals and managers 
judged accounting manipulations more harshly than  students  did,  and  students   judged  
operational  manipulations  more  harshly  than professionals and managers did. 
Ng et al. (2009) carried out a pilot study on a sample  of  262 final year  undergraduate accounting 
students, where they were asked to complete a questionnaire that tests the impact of moral intensity on 
financial accountants’ propensity to manage earnings. Different ethical scenarios were presented to 
respondents in the survey; each ethical scenario was designed in either high or low moral intensity form, 
to reflect the importance of the moral dilemma at hand. The results indicated that three o f  t h e  f i v e  
m o r a l    intensity c o m p o n e n t s  h a v e  a significant influence in the study. In addition, t- tests 
indicated that the manipulation of high and low conditions within each scenario were also successful. 
In Turkey, studies on ethical perceptions on earnings manipulation are lagging behind its counterpart in 
developed countries, Kutay et al. (2005) surveyed managers in Turkey to elicit their perception on 
creative accounting practices.  The survey targeted managers of the companies that operate in the 
Aegean Region of Turkey. Most of the respondents expressed that creative accounting practices 
frequently take place and  most of respondents believe that companies are benefiting from creative 
accounting rather than having difficulties. 
Atik (2009) noted that flexibility in selecting accounting methods sometimes motivates managers to  
choose accounting methods or to change employed ones in order to increase, decrease or smooth 
income  figures. I ncome-smoothing behaviors of Turkish listed companies are detected through 
empirical tests using discretionary accounting changes (DACs) between the years 1998 and 2003. 
Financial institutions were excluded because of accounting and  reporting  differences.  Parallel  to  
the  study  conducted  by  Moses  (1987),  income smoothing is accepted as one motivation 
of DACs and the sample firms are classified as smoothers and  non-smoothers by using Moses’ 
smoothing behavior index. Results showed that possible motivations of DACs are income smoothing, 
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economical characteristics of the periods in which the DACs are made, and the desire of Turkish firms 
to have net incomes close to zero. 
In the light of above discussion, it is noted that there is a lack in the literature generally as well as in 
Turkey specifically, as an emerging market, on the ethical perceptions of preparers and users about 
earnings manipulation. Majority of previous research have concentrated on ethical perceptions of only 
one type of earnings manipulation; earnings management, based on the questionnaire developed by 
Bruns and Merchant (1990). There is a need to e mp l o y  new research instruments and methodologies 
in this line of research, hence, this study tried to fill this gap by testing ethical perceptions of 
“preparers” and “users” of financial information using a differently set questionnaire. 
4. Research design 
4.1 Research questions 
The research questions of this study are: 
1.  To what extent ethical perceptions concerning the methods used for accounting manipulation 
differ between preparers and users? 
2.  Does the method and type of earnings manipulation have different effects on ethical perceptions 
of earnings manipulation? 
3.  Which of the methods; (i) changes in operations , (ii) changes in accounting methods and/or 
estimates , (iii) fraudulent accounting practices, respondents believe to be more in Turkey in order 
to change earnings? 
4.2. Hypotheses development 
4.2.1. Users and preparers ethical perceptions 
In cases where  parties have conflicting interests, their ethical perceptions on the same issues might 
differ, as each party would evaluate the event based on his/her perspective. It has been noted that some 
of the Turkish CPAs reported that although they have never manipulated financial information, earnings 
manipulation aiming to decrease tax liability is unavoidable for many firms because tax rates are very 
high and do not allow a living space for firms. On the other hand, it is not sound to expect that a tax 
officer would also have similar opinions concerning manipulation made to decrease tax liability. 
Therefore based on the intuition that users and preparers of financial information are two different 
groups that have conflicting interests, the following hypothesis is developed. 
H1: Users’ ethical perceptions concerning earnings manipulation are different from preparers’ 
ethical perceptions.  
Furthermore, when one  party thinks that manipulating earnings is an  ethical (unethical) behavior, 
then it  may be  expected that  this  party will  also  perceive  the  steps  taken to manipulate 
earnings as ethical  (unethical). In order to understand whether users’ ethical perceptions  
concerning  the  method  used  for  manipulation  are  different  from  those  of 
preparers, the following second hypothesis is tested. 
H2: Users’ ethical perceptions concerning the methods used for manipulation are different 
f ro m  th o se  o f  p rep a rers .    
4.2.2. Type of earnings manipulation 
After reviewing the literature on earnings manipulations, we determined that studies that have tested the 
ethical side of manipulations are rare. In general, studies were carried out to determine whether 
companies manipulate earnings or not and what the possible outcomes of manipulative behaviors are. 
However, although  no comments have been raised about the ethics of earnings manipulation, some 
studies (such as Hepworth 1953; Beidleman 1973; Moses 1987; Trueman and Titman 1988; Zucca and 
Campbell 1992; Stolowy and Breton 2000)  discuss  the  advantages  of  some  types  of  
earnings  manipulations.  Among  the advantages  of  income  smoothing;  (i)  having  
better  relations  with  investors,  creditors, workers, and so on, (ii) having  higher security 
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prices and lower cost of capital, and (iii) creating more stable capital markets. Additionally, advantages 
of big bath accounting are: (i) after having a big bath and cleaning the accounts, management  
becomes able to smooth income  figures  in  the  future,  and  this  is  good  for  the  
company,  (ii)  management  may undertake a big bath to signal investors that bad times are behind 
them and better times will follow. Therefore in the current study, it is expected that the type of earnings 
manipulation would affect ethical perceptions. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3:  Ethical p e rc e p t i o n s  o n  e a r n i n g s  m a n i p u l a t i o n  change  b y  t h e  t y p e  o f  
manipulation. 
4.2.3. Methods of earnings manipulation 
Earnings manipulation can be made  through (1) changes in operations, (2)  changes  in accounting  
methods  or  estimates,  and  (3)  fraudulent  accounting  practices.  Most of the previous 
related research (Bruns and Merchant 1990; Fischer and Rosenzweig 1995; Elias 2002; Özer et al. 2003) 
showed that operating manipulations were deemed less unethical than accounting  manipulations and 
frauds. Fraud was deemed as the most unethical case. Bruns and Merchant (1990, p.24) make the 
following explanation related to this finding: “….operating manipulations were judged more favorably 
because the earnings numbers are indicative of what actually took place. The operating manipulations 
have changed reality and truth i s  f a i r l y  repor ted”.  Based o n  the  ab o ve  d i sc u s s io n , the  
fo l l o wi n g  hypothesis  i s  developed. 
H4: Ethical perceptions on methods used for manipulation change by the type of the method. 
4.2.4. Dominant method used in practice for manipulation of earnings 
In order to understand the respondents’ thoughts about the frequency of occurrence of the three types of 
earnings manipulation methods in Turkey, this study tests the following hypothesis: 
H5: Fraudulent accounting is the dominant in practice to manipulate earnings. 
4.3. Instrument 
A questionnaire was developed for the purpose of this study that contains two sections; the  first  
section  includes  scenarios  that  describe  the  three  different  types  of  earnings 
manipulation, which are income smoothing, earnings management and big bath accounting. In 
developing the scenarios and the sub-statements, the paper inspires scenarios that have been discussed 
in previous literature (for example,  DeAngelo 1986; Bruns and Merchant 1990; Walsh  et al. 1991; 
Teoh  et al. 1998; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Guidry et al. 1999; Stolowy and Breton 2000; Buckmaster 
2001; Roosenboom  et al. 2003; Beatty and Weber 2003,). The scenarios comprise seven scenarios; 
the first scenario, describes an income smoothing case; the scenarios from two to six, describe earnings 
management cases; and the seventh scenario, describes a big  bath accounting case. The main 
difference between the scenarios is the intent of management engaging in manipulative behavior. 
Under each of the first six scenarios, there are three sub-statements that describe methods used to 
manipulate financial information. The first sub-statements of each scenario describe manipulation 
through changes in operations, the second sub-statements describe manipulations through accounting 
method or policy changes, and the third ones describe fraudulent accounting practices. Respondents 
were asked to express their opinions on the ethical acceptability of each scenario and sub-statement (or 
methods used for manipulations) based on on a five-point Likert scale, that ranged from 1  “ethically” 
to 5 “ not-ethically”. 
Table 1 summarizes the scenarios that were used to test users’ and preparers’ perceptions towards 
earning manipulation (questionnaire is available from the authors upon request). 
(Table 1 here) 
The second section of the questionnaire,  is composed of five questions covering how often managers  
change  their  operations,  accounting  methods/estimates  and  practice  fraudulent accounting 
in order to change the  financial appearance of their firms. The respondents were asked  to  rate  
their  answers  on  each  statement  based  on  a  five-point  Likert  scale  ranging  from 
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“strongly  agree”  to “strongly  disagree”  or  “always” to  “never”.  An initial version of 
the questionnaire was sent out to six accountants and four financial  analysts working in Turkey, and 
based on their feedback, minor modifications were made. 
4.4. Sample selection 
The  questionnaire  was  directed  to  financial  analysts  who  are working  in  financial 
institutions  and  evaluate financial performances of the firms applying for loans, as well as to 
portfolio managers and specialists who   work   for   investment   and   portfolio   
management   companies   were   selected   as representatives of financial  information’ users, 
to ensure awareness of the scenarios and related earnings manipulation types and methods.  
Additionally, independent and company affiliated accountants representing the preparers of financial 
information were subject to the survey.  Due to difficulty in following the random method in selecting 
the sample, where it is very  hard  to  determine  all  the  financial  information  users  
and  preparers  in  Turkey, representatives from the market were selected for this study. 
The  questionnaire  was  distributed  mainly  through  e-mail,  but  to  somewhere  
delivered through mail as  well as using a drop-off, pick-up method when convenient. There was no 
check for the response rate where the number of users and preparers participating in the survey is not 
counted. The completed questionnaires that were valid for analysis were 194; 82 from financial analysts 
and portfolio managers, 56 independent and 56 company affiliated accountants. 
 
5. Analysis of results and discussion 
The survey tests the ethical perceptions of users and preparers on earnings manipulation in Turkey and 
consensuses on the types and methods of manipulations and its effects on firms’ reports. 
5.1. Reliability test 
The questionnaire was tested for reliability and internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha. This test 
calculates the reliability coefficient (α) if one variable is removed from the original set of variables in the 
questionnaire.  This  test  helps  determine  the  set  of  variables  with  high reliability  
based  on  an  α  coefficient  above  0.7.  The coefficient of the original set of 
questionnaire variables is judged reliable using this method with scores varying between 0.732 to 0.861 
when one variable is removed from the questionnaire. 
5.2. Awareness’s on earnings manipulation scenarios 
Participants were requested to express and rate the degree to which they have awareness of scenarios 
that can be fol lo wed  for earnings  manipula t ion .  The answers of users and preparers to 
each scenario and sub-statement of the scenarios were compared using t-tests. As mentioned  before,  
preparers  (112  respondents)  are  company  affiliated  and  independent accountants, and 
users (82 respondents) are financial  analysts and portfolio managers who work for financial 
institutions. As for the fifteen of the total twenty-five questions, which are related to the scenarios, mean 
scores of the answers of preparers are higher than mean scores of the answers of users. For example, as 
shown in table 2, mean score of preparers is 2.552 against 2.549 of users for the first scenario and this is 
the case for the reset of scenarios. The results reveal that those accountants deem most of the scenarios 
and attempts under each scenario to earnings manipulation are more unethical than financial analysts 
do. However, significant differences between preparers and users exist only for certain scenarios,  
Scenario 1; 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, Scenario 2; 2.b, 2.c, Scenario 3; 3.a, Scenario 4;  4.a and  Scenario 5; 5.c, as 
follows: 
(Table 2 here) 
- The first scenario, describes an income smoothing case, where all types of attempts (changes in  
operations, changes in accounting methods or estimates, and fraud) to smooth  income  were  
deemed  more  ethical  by  financial  analysts  than  accountants. Financial analysts 
might have thought that smooth income figures are good in the long run. 
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- The second scenario, describes a managerial buyout situation where members of the board of 
directors want to take over the firm that they work for. This scenario and the attempt, which was 
changing depreciation method and recording next period’s prepaid expenses as current year’s 
expenses, were  evaluated significantly more unethical by accountants than financial analysts. 
-   According to the third scenario, question 3.a. describes a situation in which sales and promotion 
expenses are decreased and advertisement project is postponed to next year. This is also  
evaluated significantly more unethical by accountants. While evaluating the ethical acceptability 
of the methods used for manipulation, accountants might have thought the benefits and harms of 
the methods for firms in the long run. 
-   The fourth scenario, describes a situation in which a firm manipulates its financial information in 
order to decrease cost of borrowing. Financial analysts evaluated this scenario significantly more 
unethical than accountants did. This is not a surprising result. Financial analysts who responded 
to this questionnaire are working in financial institutions and use financial information of firms 
to make credit decisions. Because this scenario is about misleading them, they opposed 
manipulative behavior more strongly. 
-   According to the fifth scenario, question 5.c, which describes a fraudulent accounting practice in 
order to decrease tax payable, was also evaluated significantly more unethical by accountants. 
On light of the above discussion, the firs hypothesis, Users’ ethical perceptions concerning earnings 
manipulation are different from preparers’ ethical perceptions.   
5.3. Impact of methods of manipulations on ethical perceptions 
Analysis of preparers and users of financial information’ responses on their perceptions of the impact of 
the method of earning manipulation on ethical perceptions were carried out. Therefore, this paper argues 
that intents explained in the scenarios may affect the ethical perceptions related to the methods 
explained in each sub-question. In other words, an operating manipulation might have been perceived 
differently when it was made to smooth income rather than to decrease cost of borrowing or tax liability. 
Therefore, it is necessary to replicate the t-test with the average scores of all questions related to each 
scenario with all sub-scenarios. 
As shown table 3, there are significant differences between the ethical perceptions of users and 
preparers in scenarios one through four, in relation to income smoothing, management buyout and 
increasing share prices before an IPO were deemed significantly less unethical by users. 
(Table 3 here) 
On the other hand, the fourth scenario, which is about trying to mislead banks, was deemed significantly 
more unethical by users. Based on the above discussion, the second hypothesis, Users’ ethical 
perceptions concerning the methods used for manipulation are different from preparers’ ethical 
perceptions, is accepted. 
5.4. Type of earnings manipulation 
This study tests whether the type of earnings manipulation would affect ethical perceptions of preparers 
and users. One-way ANOVA test is used to test preparers’ and users’ responses for the scenarios 
presented. As shown in table 4, the results suggest that there are significant differences between the 
scenarios. Scheffe test showed that there are four homogeneous subsets of the scenarios. The first 
subset is composed of Scenarios 1, 7, 4 and 5, the second subset comprises scenarios 7, 4, 5 and 3, the 
third one is composed of scenarios 5, 3 and 6, and the last one includes only the scenario 2. 
(Table 4 here) 
Ethical perceptions about income smoothing scenario are similar to big bath accounting scenario, 
however different from earnings management scenarios. Additionally, income smoothing and big bath 
accounting are deemed as the least unethical earnings manipulation. On the other hand, earnings 
manipulations that are made for the benefits of managers are deemed as the most unethical ones. Hence, 
the third hypothesis, Ethical perceptions on earnings manipulations change by the type of manipulation, 
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is accepted. 
Further test is carried out based on the average scores of each scenario and related sub- statements.  
As shown in table 5, there are three homogeneous subsets of the scenarios. The first subset is composed 
of scenario 1 and 7, the second one is composed of scenarios 4, 3, 5 and 2, and the third one comprises 
only the scenario 6.  Again, ethical perceptions related to income smoothing and big bath accounting 
are similar, but significantly different from the ethical perceptions related to earnings management 
scenarios. This time scenario 6, which is about increasing bonus payments, is the most unethical 
scenario. 
(Table 5 here) 
The methods used for manipulation were also compared with one-way ANOVA test. Results showed 
that ethical perceptions about the three types of methods are significantly different from  each  other.  
Manipulation through changes in operations was deemed as the least unethical one, followed by 
manipulation through changing accounting methods and/or estimates. As expected, fraudulent 
accounting practices were deemed as the most unethical. 
5.5. Manipulation through changes in real operations 
As shown in table 6, 46.12 % of the respondents think that manipulation through changes in real 
operations take place “always” or “often, 47.67 % think that they happen “sometimes” and only 6.22 % 
think they take place “rarely” or “never”. Results of T-test suggest that preparers and users think 
similar about the frequency of the occurrence of this type of manipulation method. 
(Table 6 here) 
5.6. Manipulation through changes in accounting methods and/or estimates 
As shown in table 7, 53.12 % of the respondents strongly agree or agree  that manipulation through 
changes in accounting methods and/or estimates take place in Turkey, 39.06 % of respondents 
disagree on the occurrence of such manipulation, and only 7.81 % of respondents express 
that such manipulation “rarely” or “never” take place. T-test results show that there are significant 
differences between the answers of accountants and financial analysts about the frequency of 
occurrence of the changes in accounting methods and/or estimates. A higher percentage of users think 
that this type of manipulation method takes place more frequently. 
(Table 7 here) 
5.7. Manipulation through fraudulent accounting 
As shown in table 8, 47.64 % of the respondents think that fraudulent accounting practices take place 
“always” or “often”, 38.2 % think that they happen “sometimes” and only 14.14% think they take place 
“rarely” or “never”. Again, there are significant differences between the answers of accountants and 
financial analysts about the frequency of occurrence of frauds. Users think that managers engage in 
fraudulent accounting more frequently. 
(Table 8 here) 
As the summary of tables 6, 7 and 8, we can say that most of the respondents think that all of the 
methods to manipulate earnings are very common and practiced very often in Turkey. 
6. Conclusion  
Existing related literature examines mainly the ethical acceptability of earnings management practices 
and perspectives of accountants, accounting major students and academics. Other types of earnings 
manipulation such as income smoothing and big bath accounting, and perspectives of other parties such 
as users, have been ignored by ma j or i ty  o f  p rev io us  research. This study aimed to fill this gap. 
The ethical perception  differences of financial analysts and accountants  about  three  types  of  
earnings  manipulations  were   examined  by  using  a questionnaire. The scenarios in the 
questionnaire were developed based on the existing literature and included the information about the 
purposes of management and three types of attempts to realize these purposes. 
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The findings of this study reveal that users o f  account ing in format ion evaluate most of the 
scenarios and attempts more unethical than preparers do. This is an interesting result because 
manipulations and frauds harm mostly users, so it was expected that users would oppose manipulative 
behavior more severely. 
Significant differences exist between ethical perceptions of users and preparers related to scenario 1 
(income smoothing), scenario 2 (management buyout), scenario 3 (manipulation before an IPO), and 
scenario 4 (misleading banks).  Accountants oppose  the  first  three scenarios more strongly; 
however,  financial analysts  assess the  fourth  scenario as  more unethical. 
Additionally, statistical results revealed that the respondents think that the three types of manipulation 
tools significantly different from each other.  As it is expected, the most unethical tool is 
fraudulent accounting, then manipulation through accounting changes and manipulation through 
operational changes. Here, some questions arise. Although accountants think that earnings manipulation 
and fraud are unethical, what factors motivate them to behave unethical? Might some factors be high tax 
rates, fear of losing their jobs, or being evaluated and paid according to financial results? Future research 
may concentrate on these subjects. 
For the preparation and presentation of reliable and useful financial information, there are many 
responsible parties other than accountants, such as governmental agencies, owners or investors o f  
f i r ms , a n d  t o p  ma n a g e r s .  Each of these  p a r t i e s  s ho u ld  t r y  to  c r e a t e  a n  environment in 
which accountants feel free to behave according to their rights and wrongs. Additionally, accounting 
ethics education will help accountants to develop better ethical rules while deciding on what is wrong 
and right. Therefore, improving the quality of accounting ethics education and making it widespread is 
very important in Turkey. 
7. Limitations of the Study 
The most important limitation of this study is the small sample size. Although there may thousands  of 
financial information users and preparers, findings of the study is derived based on the answers of only 
194 respondents. The second limitation is that the responses were not anonymous. The respondents 
delivered the filled questionnaire through e- mail. Although they were informed that the answers would 
be kept strictly confidential, their answers might have been different if the research was web-based. 
Furthermore, concerning the scenarios described in the questionnaire, the intent behind the earnings 
manipulation was explained. However, in the real world, it is impossible to understand real intents of a 
firm when it changes its operations and/or its accounting methods. Therefore, in a real operating 
environment, without knowing the real purpose, making ethically related judgments will be very 
difficult. 
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Table 1. The different scenarios of earnings manipulation  
Earnings 
Manipulation 
Type 
Scenario 
(the purpose or intent of 
management) 
 
The Method used for manipulation 
Income 
Smoothing 
1. To have smooth income 
figures over the long run 
1.a. Changing real operations 
1.b. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
1.c. Fraudulent accounting 
Earnings 
Management 
2. To take over the firm 
(Management buyout case) 
2.a. Changing real operations 
2.b. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
2.c. Fraudulent accounting 
3. To increase share prices 
before an initial public offering 
3.a. Changing real operations 
3.b. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
3.c. Fraudulent accounting 
4. To decrease cost of borrowing 4.a. Changing real operations 
4.b. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
4.c. Fraudulent accounting 
5. To decrease taxes payable 
amount 
5.a. Changing real operations 
5.b. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
5.c. Fraudulent accounting 
6. To increase bonus payments 
of top executives 
6.a. Changing real operations 
6.b. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
6.c. Fraudulent accounting 
Big Bath 
Accounting 
7. To benefit from the 
opportunity of blaming previous 
management for the poor results 
of the current year 
7. Changing accounting methods or estimates 
   (Method is indicated in the scenario) 
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Table 2. Users and preparers perceptions on earnings manipulation scenarios 
 
 Average Mean t-statistics 
Scenarios Preparers Users 
Scenario 1 2.552 2.549 0.013 
S1.A 2.369 1.802 3.156* 
S1.B 3.464 3.024 2.260** 
S1.C 4.315 3.864 2.834* 
Scenario 2 4.424 4.000 2.521** 
S2.A 3.613 3.825 -1.116 
S2.B 3.748 3.275 2.271** 
S2.C 4.342 3.827 3.214* 
Scenario 3 3.276 3.062 0.908 
S3.A 2.640 2.259 1.907*** 
S3.B 3.261 2.963 1.366 
S3.C 4.423 4.439 -0.120 
Scenario 4 2.575 3.242 -2.867* 
S4.A 1.757 2.225 -2.350** 
S4.B 2.901 2.938 -0.177 
S4.C 4.063 4.038 0.158 
Scenario 5 3.114 3.092 0.091 
S5.A 2.523 2.738 -1.061 
S5.B 2.536 2.506 0.142 
S5.C 4.064 3.709 2.053** 
Scenario 6 3.600 3.692 -0.410 
S6.A 3.718 3.863 -0.768 
S6.B 3.682 3.863 -1.028 
S6.C 4.126 3.875 1.569 
Scenario 7 2.896 2.595 1.363 
* Significant at 0.01 level, ** Significant at 0.05 level  *** Significant at 0.1 level  
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Table 3: Comparison of mean scores of the scenarios between the user and the preparer groups 
 Group N Mean Std. Dev. t-statistics 
Scenario 1  Preparers  112 3.209 1.000 3.165* 
Users 82 2.818 0.721  
Scenario 2 Preparers  112 4.021 0.907 2.183** 
Users 82 3.721 0.991  
Scenario 3  Preparers  112 3.428 0.995 1.776*** 
Users 82 3.184 0.873  
Scenario 4  Preparers  112 2.861 0.914 -1.684*** 
Users 82 3.098 1.031  
Scenario 5  Preparers  112 3.062 1.036 0.223 
Users 82 3.030 0.864  
Scenario 6  Preparers  112 3.800 0.948 -0.214 
Users 82 3.829 0.888  
Scenario 7 Preparers  112 2.896 1.462 1.363 
Users 82 2.595 1.384  
* Significant at 0.01 level   ** Significant at 0.05 level   *** Significant at 0.1 level  
 
 
Table 4.  Comparison of the ethical perceptions concerning the type of earnings manipulation 
ANOVA  F = 28.223 Sig. = 0.000 
Scheffe Test Results 
 N Subset for alpha = .05 
Scenario  1 2 3 4 
1 (IS) 167 2.551    
7 (BBA) 170 2.765 2.765   
4 (EM) 153 2.863 2.863   
5 (EM) 153 3.105 3.105 3.105  
3 (EM) 152  3.184 3.184  
6 (EM) 150   3.640  
2 (EM) 163    4.239 
 Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a.) Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 157.932. 
b.) The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not 
guaranteed. 
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Table 5. Comparison of the ethical perceptions concerning the type of earnings manipulation- average  
        score  
 
ANOVA F = 76.910 Sig. = 0.000 
Scheffe Test Results 
 N Subset for alpha = .05 
Scenario  1 2 3 
1 194 2.614   
7 170 2.765   
4 194  3.182  
3 194  3.253  
5 194  3.467  
2 194  3.491  
6 194   4.285 
 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a.) Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 190.165. 
b.) The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not 
guaranteed. 
 
Table 6. Opinions on occurrence of changes in operations 
  
                                              
All Respondents 
 Users        Preparers 
 Freq. %   Freq. %  Freq. % 
Always 7 3.63  1 1.22  6 5.41 
Often 82 42.49  41 50.00  41 36.94 
Sometimes 92 47.67  36 43.90  56 50.45 
Rarely 11 5.70  4 4.88  7 6.31 
Never 1 0.52  0 0  1 0.90 
Total 193 100  82 100  111 100 
Missing 1   0   1  
Total 194   82   112  
 
Table 7. Opinions on occurrence of changes in accounting methods/estimates 
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All Respondents 
 Users            Preparers 
 Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. % 
Strongly agree 16 8.33  6 7.32  10 9.09 
Agree 86 44.79  47 57.32  39 35.45 
Neither agree nor disagree 75 39.06  25 30.49  50 45.45 
Disagree 11 5.73  4 4.88  7 6.36 
Strongly disagree 4 2.08  0 0  4 3.64 
Total 192 100  82 100  110 100 
Missing 2   0   2  
Total 194   82   112  
 
Table 8. Opinions on occurrence of fraudulent accounting practices 
 
                                               
All Respondents 
 Users  Preparers 
 Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. % 
Always 15 7.85  8 10  7 6.31 
Often 76 39.79  43 53.75  33 29.73 
Sometimes 73 38.22  27 33.75  46 41.44 
Rarely 16 8.38  2 2.5  14 12.61 
Never 11 5.76  0 0  11 9.91 
Total 191 100  80 100  111 100 
Missing 3   2   1  
Total 194   82   112  
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